

# Extensional versus intensional reasoning: Yet another pragmatic view of the conjunction fallacy

Dani Navarro, Alison McCann, Alexandra Tingey,  
Michelle Keshwa, Nicole Baz, and Amy Perfors

Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.

Which is more probable?


- (a) Linda is a bank teller
- (b) Linda is a feminist bank teller

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Linda is 31 years old, **single**, **outspoken**, and very **bright**. She majored in **philosophy**. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of **discrimination** and **social justice**, and also participated in **anti-nuclear** demonstrations.




**feminist** bank teller

When (and why)  
does this similarity  
drive our reasoning  
in the problem?


## Extensional reasoning

- What are the attributes of Linda
- Goal is to infer the categories in the world to which Linda belongs
- Conjunctive categories are nested within the marginal & therefore less likely



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## Intensional reasoning

- What does the speaker intend this passage to mean?
- What category is the “best” description of Linda?
- Conjunctive inference is not necessarily wrong



feminists ▷ *smart, social justice, risk-seeking, ...*

bank tellers ▷ *smart, logical, risk-averse, ...*

both ▷ *smart, social justice, logical, risk-neutral, ...*

# Grice (1975)

Dani: Let me tell you about my friend Linda. She's 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.

Amy: Ah okay, she's a feminist. Cool.

Dani: What? No she's not a feminist. Why would you even think that? That's just weird. You're weird

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The conjunction fallacy arises when the correct  
intensional inference conflicts with the correct  
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Experiments 1-3

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Experiments 1-3

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Experiments 4-6

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Experiments 4-6

(3) We should be able to demonstrate and  
manipulate a demand effect when people have to  
reason about purely physical quantities (dice rolls)



Experiments 7-9

# Experiments 1-3

On the relationship between conjunction  
fallacies and speaker intention

## Exp 1: “taboo task”

generate a vignette that *implies*  
*but does not state* that...

...Linda is a feminist


blah

N=20, UNSW




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## Exp 2: “mind reading task”

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
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## Exp 3: “probability judgment task”

given this vignette, what is the  
probability that Linda is a \_\_\_\_\_?

N=199, MTurk





## **Exp 1: Example vignette for “Linda is a feminist”**

*Linda is 31 and has had a rough upbringing, growing up with an abusive father which restricted her mother and her freedom. This upbringing was what made her decide to **major in sociology and psychology** within university. She has strong views on politics and other **similar matters that affect men and women**. She regularly attends **rallies and protests** on the weekend.*





## Exp 1: Example vignette for “Paula is a bank teller”

*Paula is 30, and loves buying clothes even at her age of 30. She is in **contact with money** so much that she has been able to **calculate the exact change** given before the cashier has given it to her. Her skills in counting are ingrained within her brain that she cannot turn it off, due to **years dealing with cash***



## **Exp I: Example vignette for “Brenda is a feminist and a bank teller”**

*Brenda is 32 years old, methodical, **logical, and passionate** about her beliefs. She is very good with **both people and numbers** and is often able to spot errors. She is trusted by her friends to handle the money when planning an overseas trip. She is also a very individual woman and looks up to celebrities such as Emma Watson*




Marginal 1	Marginal 2	Conjunction
Feminist	Bank teller	Feminist & bank teller
Engineer	Jazz musician	Engineer & jazz musician
Introvert	Chef	Introvert & chef
Journalist	Anxious person	Journalist & anxious person
Painter	Accountant	Painter & accountant
Extrovert	Statistician	Extrovert & statistician
Pacifist	Boxer	Pacifist & boxer
Butcher	Empath	Butcher & empath
Writer	Mechanic	Writer & mechanic

## Experiment 2

Which of the following do you believe the writer was trying to communicate when they wrote this description:


- Linda is a bank teller
- Linda is a feminist
- Linda is both a bank teller and a feminist
- None of the above








When the speaker's true intention was a **marginal**, people correctly select that marginal



**(correct) marginal**



## Experiment 3



How likely is it that Linda belongs to each of the following categories?

- Teacher: \_\_\_\_\_%
- Feminist: \_\_\_\_\_% ←
- Chef: \_\_\_\_\_%
- Feminist and bank teller: \_\_\_\_\_%
- Neurosurgeon and pessimist: : \_\_\_\_\_%

### **Matched marginal:**

one of the options  
matches the speaker's  
true intent



## Experiment 3



How likely is it that Linda belongs to each of the following categories?

- Teacher: \_\_\_\_\_%
- Bank teller: \_\_\_\_\_%
- Chef: \_\_\_\_\_%
- Feminist and bank teller: \_\_\_\_\_%
- Neurosurgeon and pessimist: : \_\_\_\_\_%

### **Mismatched marginal:**

the only way to endorse the correct *intension* (if only partially) is to choose the conjunction

## Experiment 3




How likely is it that Brenda belongs to each of the following categories?

- Teacher: \_\_\_\_\_%
- Accountant: \_\_\_\_\_%
- Activist: : \_\_\_\_\_%
- Accountant and painter: \_\_\_\_\_%
- Neurosurgeon and pessimist: : \_\_\_\_\_%


**conjunction** condition:  
the true intention is the  
conjunction



Probability of category membership




Matched marginal doesn't produce conjunction fallacy




Nor does the conjunction

Probability of category membership



Conjunction effects occur when a *partially correct intensional inference* (feminist bank teller) is placed in conflict with a *technically correct extensional inference* (bank teller)



## Experiments 4-6:

Does the strength of the conjunction fallacy depend on the strength of the “demand” to reason intensionally?

Cover story


**Random**

Everything is  
generated randomly  
by a machine


**Social**


Everything is  
generated by a  
helpful human


Designed to push people towards  
**extensional** reasoning or  
**intensional** reasoning












	Stimuli	Analog in T&K (1983)	How much does the task rely on natural communication?
Exp. 4	No vignette text; <i>only</i> the response option text is manipulated	“Mr G” task	Not much
Exp. 5	Minimalistic vignette; a single sentence	?	A little



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Exp. 5	Minimalistic vignette; a single sentence	?	A little
Exp. 6	Full vignette; all text from Exp 1-3	“Linda” task	A lot

## Stimuli


Exp. 4

No vignette;  
Just response

The conjunction effect disappears  
entirely when framed as an  
extensional reasoning problem

**Social**

**Random**




## Stimuli

Exp. 5

Minimal vignette

People still produce the conjunction fallacy, but there is a modest effect of the manipulation... A shift in the proportion of people explicitly endorsing the marginal



## Stimuli


Exp. 6

Full vignette

No effect  
whatsoever!

**Social**

**Random**





## Stimuli

Exp. 4

No vignette text; only  
the response option  
text is manipulated

Exp. 5

Minimalistic vignette;  
only a single sentence

Exp. 6


Full vignette; all  
text from Exp 1-3

How much does the  
task rely on natural  
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Not much

A little

A lot



## Stimuli

Exp. 4

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the response option  
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Exp. 5

Minimalistic vignette;  
only a single sentence

Exp. 6

Full vignette; all  
text from Exp 1-3

How much does the  
task rely on natural  
communication?

Not much

A little

A lot

How much can we push  
the the conjunction  
effect around?

A lot



A little

No

## Experiments 7-9:



Pragmatic reasoning in a mechanistic  
probability judgment task

Common methodology: all tasks  
require people to reason about a  
die with 4 blue and 2 orange sides



### Experiment 7

- Pure probability judgment
- All sequences of length 6 or less




### Experiment 8

- Reasoning about intentions
- All sequences of length 6 or less

### Experiment 9


- Manipulate the task demand
- Probabilistic v. pragmatic

## Experiment 7




For each trial please indicate how likely you think the sequence is from 1-17,  
where **1 is Very Unlikely** and **17 is Very Likely**

## Experiment 7



People are well calibrated for sequences of the same length


## Experiment 7



There is an adjustment for the length of the sequence, but the effect is modest



## Experiment 7



### Experiment 7

- No framing
- Pure probability judgment
- All sequences of length 6 or less

### Experiment 8

- Reasoning about intentions
- All sequences of length 6 or less



### Experiment 9

- Manipulate the task demand
- Probabilistic v. pragmatic

## Experiment 8

You should imagine that these sequences have been selected by a helpful teacher, who knows the properties of the dice, to try and teach you about it



## Experiment 8

trial: 1/20

The helpful teacher has given you the following sequence...



How many **Blue** sides do you think the dice has?\*

- ☐ 0   ☐ 1   ☐ 2   ☐ 3   ☐ 4   ☐ 5   ☐ 6

How many **Orange** sides do you think the dice has?\*

- ☐ 0   ☐ 1   ☐ 2   ☐ 3   ☐ 4   ☐ 5   ☐ 6

How many **Red** sides do you think the dice has?\*

- ☐ 0   ☐ 1   ☐ 2   ☐ 3   ☐ 4   ☐ 5   ☐ 6

## Experiment 8

Missing data analysis ☺

Gist of it is that people do assume representativeness (not a surprise).

But the data are useful for...

### Experiment 7


- No framing
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### Experiment 8

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### Experiment 9

- Manipulate the task demand
- Probabilistic v. pragmatic



## Experiment 9

### **Random**

Choose the sequence most likely to appear. After making a selection, people had to **actually watch the dice rolls** and wait for the outcome sequence before they could move on to the next trial

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### Random

Choose the sequence most likely to appear. After making a selection, people had to **actually watch the dice rolls** and wait for the outcome sequence before they could move on to the next trial

### Social

Choose the sequence most likely to teach a human reasoner the properties of the dice. After making a selection, the results from experiment #8 were used to provide feedback about what a **real human learner would have inferred**



## Experiment 9

### Random

Choose the sequence most likely to appear. After making a selection, people had to **actually watch the dice rolls** and wait for the outcome sequence before they could move on to the next trial

### Social


Choose the sequence most likely to teach a human reasoner the properties of the dice. After making a selection, the results from experiment #8 were used to provide feedback about what a **real human learner would have inferred**

### T&K

They were asked to gamble \$25 (not real money) on the sequence most likely to appear. Pure description, no feedback or experience provided.

## Experiment 9

Proportion of  
conjunction  
choices



**Conclusions?**

“people are smart”...

- Intensional reasoning allows conjunction inference, extensional does not
- The real world necessarily obeys extensional logic; human communication follows intensional logic
- Reasoning can be (partly) changed by shifting the pragmatics

“people are limited”...

- People do sometimes use the wrong kind of logic?
- Strictly construed, T&K style tasks really do ask extensional questions, but people seem to treat them as intensional by default.
- It is very hard to shift this in natural communication, but not so hard when learning from observational data


**Thanks!**

## But didn't X already do this?

- Tversky & Kahneman... agree with the “extensional vs intuitive” idea, but it can't all be representativeness because we can manipulate the effect by changing the task demands
- Hertwig & Gigerenzer... agree with their “pragmatic” theory, but disagree with the limitation to low level pragmatics about the meaning of the word “and”
- Griffiths, Tenenbaum, Shafto, Goodman etc... agree with Bayesian models of representativeness and pragmatic reasoning (and in fact have implemented them for these tasks!), but those ideas haven't ever been applied to the conjunction fallacy

# An overly simplistic Bayesian model of intensional reasoning

prior probability of each category




The important thing is that these are represented as competing hypotheses for the meaning of the text

prior probability of  
each category



$$P(x|h)$$




likelihood of  
each feature  
according to  
each category



prior probability of each category



$$P(x|h)$$




description of Linda  $\mathcal{X}$



Posterior distribution over  
all three hypotheses for the  
intension of the Linda story

$$P(h|x) \propto P(x|h)P(h)$$



The intended meaning of the  
Linda story is that “Linda is a  
feminist”

Posterior distribution over  
two hypotheses for the  
intension of the Linda story

